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Anticipated Mission Tasks
The original FTS concept for Space Station Freedom (SSF) was to provide telerobotic assistance
to enhance crew activity and safety and to reduce crew EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) activity. The
first flight of the FTS manipulator systems would demonstrate several candidate tasks and would
verify manipulator performance parameters. These first flight tasks included unlocking a SSF
Truss Joint, mating/demating a fluid coupling, contact following of a contour board, demonstrating
peg-in-hole assembly, and grasping and moving a mass. Future tasks foreseen for the FTS
system included ORU (Orbit Replaceable Unit) change-out, Hubble Space Telescope Servicing,
Gamma Ray Observatory refueling, and several in-situ SSF servicing and maintenance tasks.
Operation of the FTS was planned to evolve from teleoperation to fully autonomous execution of
many tasks.
This wide range of mission tasks combined with the desire to evolve toward full autonomy forced
several requirements which may seem extremely demanding to the telerobotics community. The
FTS requirements appear to have been created to accommodate the open-ended evolution plan
such that operational evolution would not be impeded by function limitations. A recommendation
arising from the FTS program to remedy the possible impacts from such ambitious requirements is
to analyze candidate robotic tasks. Based on these task analyses, weigh operational impacts
against development impacts prior to requirements definition. Many of the FTS requirements
discussed in the following sections greatly influenced the development cost and schedule of the
FTS manipulator. The FTS manipulator has been assembled at Marlin Marietta and is currently in
testing. Successful component tests indicate a manipulator which achieves unprecedentedperformance specifications.
Functional Requirements
The functional requirements of the manipulator involve environmental, performance, safety, and
resource effects. Many of these requirements are driven by the space environment, such as
operation in thermal extremes, the need for safety, and limited resource availability (weight and
power). Most of these requirements, however, focus on the manipulator and component
functions to insure superior performance and ability to upgrade (evolution toward autonomy).
The primary robotic function of the FTS manipulator is that it move or manipulator objects in zero-
gravity. Because interchangeable end-effectors were being considered, the manipulator
requirements specify the tool-plate as the point of reference. The tool plate is the attachment
point for the wrist force/torque sensor. A manipulated object's mass may be as high as 37 slugs
(1200 lb.) with the manipulator able to move masses less that 2.8 slugs (90 lb.) at velocities of 6
inch/second. Unloaded tool plate velocity will be at least 24 inch/second. Accuracy of tool-plate
positioning relative to the manipulator base frame must be within 1 inch and _+3 degrees. The
manipulator must be able to resolve tool-plate incremental motion within 0.001 inch and 0.01
degrees. Additionally, repeatability must be within 0.005 inch and + 0.05 degrees with respect to
the manipulator base frame. To perform useful work, the FTS manipulator was required to provide
20 pounds force and 20 foot-pounds torque output at the tool plate in any direction and in any
manipulator configuration. These output force and positioning requirements were to be utilized
with several control schemes including joint control, Cartesian control, and impedance control.
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The FTS Manipulator
To operate in space, the FTS manipulator had to meet the shuttle safety requirements as well as
the environmental extremes. The safety requirements, as discussed elsewhere in this paper,
ensure Orbiter and crew safety through fault tolerance requirements. Safety is cited by Shattuck
and Lowde (1992) as "the single largest factor driving the system design." Safety and fault
tolerance requirements resulted in monitoring of joint and Cartesian data, in checking of loop
times to ensure proper functioning, in cross-strapping along communication paths, and in addition
of a hardwire control capability as a backup operational mode. Orbiter launch and landing Impart
vibration into the system which requires structural analysis and testing. Electromagnetic
interference (EMI) must be limited both from invading and from exiting the manipulator systems.
However, the most demanding aspect of the space environment from the FTS designer's view is
the thermal vacuum of space. Operation in a hard vacuum (10-5 torr) and over temperatures from
-50°C to 95°C forces innovative designs, careful material selection, and extensive analysis.
Another consequence of the space environment is operation in zero-gravity. Designing the
manipulator for a zero-g environment impacts structural, electromechanical, and electrical power
considerations and well as the control system design. Because weight is a premium in space,
motors are chosen to provide torques for zero-g operation. This saves significant weight and
electrical power when compared to motors chosen for ground-based operation. Smaller motors
also benefit the thermal control system. The structure must also be lightweight, which increases
flexibility and lowers structural bending mode frequencies. While being lightweight and more
flexible, space manipulators are expected to handle payloads more massive than the manipulator.
This expectation is far different from terrestrial manipulators which usually handle payloads 1/10
their weight. To maintain stability and performance, a 10:1 ratio is maintained between the first
bending mode and the control bandwidth. This ratio precludes use of high bandwidth PID servos
used in more massive, terrestrial manipulators. To address the stability and performance issues in
the FTS manipulator, the structure was designed for stiffness (12 Hz first bending mode) and the
manipulator control has a 1.2 Hz bandwidth, an Inertia decoupler, and joint-level torque, position,
and velocity servo loops.
Manipulator Design and Technologies
Beyond safety, FTS manipulator design was driven by the thermal'environment and the
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positioning performance specifications. Of course, each manipulator subsystem was influenced
by additional constraints and specifications. The followlng paragraphs describe the manipulator
subsystem designs and technologies developed by Martin Marietta and its subcontractors to
meet the FTS requirements. Manipulator subsystems discussed include manipulator kinematic
design, link structure, actuators, control systems, and the end-of-arm tooling.
Manipulator Kinemati_
A 7-DOF (degree-of-freedom) R-Y-P-P-P-Y-R design is used with the first joint (shoulder roll)
utilized for task-dependent configuration optimization. The outer 6 joints are actively controlled
for coordinated output motion. The kinematic design has few joint offsets and 90° twist angles to
simplify the kinematics. The 6-DOF kinematic arrangement, with three adjacent pitch joints,
provides a closed-form Inverse kinematic solution with few singularities within the manipulator
workspace. The singularities which occur when the wrist roll or wrist yaw align with the shoulder
yaw are beyond the usual workspace of the manipulator. Other singularities occurring at joint limits
and when the elbow passes over the "home" position, shown below, are eliminated with
mechanical and software joint travel limits. The 3 inch displacement of the elbow joint is to allow
the arm to fold back on itself for a greater workspace.
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FTS Manipulator. "Home" Position
The manipulator links provide structural support as well as joint controller electronics packaging
and thermal control. Packaging and thermal control determined link sizes while fracture and
stiffness considerations drove the structural design of the links. A stiffness requirement of
1,000,000 pounds/foot and 1,000,000 foot-pounds/radian resulted in a smallest structural safety
margin which exceeds 14, far greater than Shuttle requirement for a 1.4 factor of safety. Easy
access to electronics is through side plates on the links. To avoid the cost and complication of
active cooling, radiation is the primary thermal path. The controller boards sit in slots within the
links which provide conduction paths to the link structure for radiation to the environment. The
link designs use material coatings, mounting, and Kapton/Inconel film heaters to maintain thermal
control.
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The joint actuator designs, developed by Martin Marietta and Schaeffer Magnetics, were also
driven by positioning, performance, and thermal demands. These high-performance, zero
backlash actuators each house a DC-motor, an harmonic drive transmission, an output torque
sensor, an output position sensor, a fail-safe brake, hard-stops, and intemally routed cabling. The
design achieves considerable commonality between actuators. Three sizes are used - one for the
3 shoulder joints, one elbow joint, and one for the 3 wrist joints.
The DC-motors have brushless, delta-wound stators with samarium cobalt rotors. This design
offers good thermal properties, low EMI, minimal rotational losses, and linear torque-speed
relationships. Motor commutation signals are generated from Hall Effect sensors, a second set of
which is installed for redundancy. A secondary set of windings within the stator, driven via an
independent electrical path, provides at least 10% rated torque and 0.5 degrees/second joint
velocity for operation of a backup mode. This degraded mode of operation, commanded joint-by-
joint, satisfies the need for sating the manipulator after failure of a primary system. Fail-safe brakes
attached to the motor rotor shaft are spring-loaded so that loss of power engages the brake.
These brakes may be released with an EVA release bolt, which when tumed 90 ° releases a cam
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on the brake armature.
Harmonic drives provide 100:1 backdrivable gear reduction in a compact volume. The harmonic
drives were chosen with HUIC-sedes cups and S-tooth profile teeth for torsional stiffness and zero
backlash. Cup size is determined by joint torsional stiffness requirements. In fact, because of the
relative flexibility of the harmonic drive, all other torsion members are considered rigid. Rather
than the standard Oldham coupling to the wave generator, a specially designed cylindrical coupler
was used to eliminate backlash. Additionally, the output is coupled to a flange around the motor
and harmonic drive. This flange, mounted to large duplex bearings provides compactness,
rigidity, and an efficient load path the output link.
An analog torque loop is implemented in the joint servos to accommodate the non-linear and
high-frequency affects of the harmonic drives. Sensor values to the torque loop come from an
output torque sensor embedded on the harmonic drive output flange. Strain gages are mounted
to the spokes of the titanium flange. This sensor placement isolates the sensor from structural
loads (bending), thus primarily transmitting actuator torque. For effective performance, this analog
torque loop operates at 1500 Hz.
Like the manipulator structure, actuator housings and bearings were designed for stiffness and
thermal stability. A standard bearing steel, 440C stainless, is used for all bearings. Bearing
lubricant is Braycote 601, a liquid lubricant used in space applications. Its very low vapor pressure
allows the actuator to not be sealed, but still designed to resist contamination and assembled in a
clean room. The motor bearings are deep-groove roller bearings sized for the thrust load of brake
engagement and spring pre-loaded to minimize temperature sensitivity. The output bearings are
large diameter, duplex-pair, angular contact bearings (face-to-face mounting). These bearings
share radial and thrust loads with another duplex-pair on the other side of the actuator. An
exception is the wrist roll, which has a single, duplex pair mounted back-to-back for better rigidity
against the bending moments of the full cantilever load. Unfortunately, this back-to-back
installation has greater sensitivity to assembly misalignments. This sensitivity may contribute to
the excessive, uncompensated friction discovered during recent wrist roll torque loop tests.
The actuator housings are aluminum and titanium. "titanium is utilized near bearings. The similar
thermal properties of 440C stainless and 6AI-4V titanium minimize temperature effects on beadng
pre-loads. These pre-loads were determined as a compromise between stiffness and friction
drag. The actuator case was designed for thermal needs. Motor and brake heat is dissipated to
the ends or to the casing and then radiated to the environment. Like the links, the actuator
design uses thermal isolation, material coatings, and internally mounted film heaters to protect
bearings from thermal gradients. These gradients could adversely affect actuator friction and
positioning accuracy.
The positioning and incremental motion requirements call for encoder data within an arc-minute at
resolutions to 22-bit sensor. To meet this need, inductive encoders were developed specifically
for the FTS program by Aerospace Controls Corporation. These encoders have a fine and a
coarse track used for incremental and absolute position resolution, respectively. Temperature
effects on sensor accuracy were discovered during thermal testing. These errors were stable and
repeatable with temperature, and are thus have been corrected in software.
All cabling in the manipulator is internally routed through links and actuators. Each actuator has a
cable passageway designed to eliminate twisting of cabling and thus minimizing chafing
opportunity. The innovative cabling within these actuators is of Flat Conductor Cables (FCC),
manufactured by Tayco, Inc. FCC is used in space applications, but for this application up to 34
layers of laminated cables are used in a single actuator passageway. The cables consist of
alternating layers of Kapton, FEP, and photo etched copper conductors with a vapor-deposited
copper shield. These cables are to operate from '50°C to 95°C through thousands of cycles.
These cables rout serial data, video signals, power, and discrete signals. Acceptance tests of a
few cables indicated minor lamination problems apparently due to entrapped water vapor.
Investigation of the cable manufacture and test indicated several areas for possible change as well
as a method for cable repair. Recent cable tests to 100,000 mechanical cycles over full
temperature ranges verified continued cable functionality.
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The FTS manipulator control design provides 6-DOF active control over a wide range of payloads
as well as impedance control for stable contact. The control algorithms are specified according to
the NASREM architecture (NASNNBS Standard Reference Model for Robotic Systems).
NASREM is implemented as a layered architecture with 4 levels: Task, Elemental-Move, Primitive,
and Servo. Use of these levels allows operation from teleoperation, the Servo level, advancing to
fully autonomous task sequencing, the Task level. Developments to date have focused on the
Servo level commands. The Servo level receives Cartesian manipulator commands and
transforms them to joint level servo commands. Efforts with the NASREM Primitive level have
incorporated point-to-point Cartesian path generation.
The wide payload range specified for the FTS manipulator causes the manipulator joints to
experience inertial loads over several orders of magnitude. These loads are induced by the
coupling which occurs between joints and affects the trajectory-tracking accuracy of the
manipulator. The position controller implemented in the FTS manipulator compensates for these
torques with a model-based inertial decoupler. The feed-forward decoupling scheme computes
expected inertial torques due to commanded motion and sums this torque with the joint
command. The position-dependent inertia matrices used to calculate these torques are
computed every 200 ms. This value was chosen as a compromise of accuracy and computationalburden.
In addition to the free-space performance requirements, satisfied with the position controller and
inertial decoupler, the FTS manipulator must provide stable contact with its impedance control.
The impedance controller is position-based, that is, the manipulator and joints are treated as
actuators of Cartesian position. Thus, end-effector force measurements are transformed into
Cartesian motion commands based on a desired output impedance. This approach was chosen
over a torque-based approach because a torque-based approach has instabilities for higher
stiffness values and may have difficulty applying large forces to a worksite. Also, a torque-based
approach may store energy, resulting in large accelerations when contact is broken. To maintain
stability during the transition from free-space motion to contact, a joint velocity feedback term is
included for "augmented damping." The resulted lightly damped contact insures stability, but
when contact is broken the free-space motion becomes overdamped and sluggish. A feed-
forward velocity term is implemented to compensate for this poor free-space response. These
control schemes, which increase the complexity of the controller are designed to meet the FTS
free-space motion, payload capacity, and contact performance requirements.
An emergency shutdown (ESD) system is embedded in the manipulator control architecture. This
system was implemented to provide active control of hazards to meet the payload safety
requirement to be two-fault tolerant against catastrophic hazards. The primary hazards in this case
are unplanned contact and excessive force generation. The ESD approach is to use 3 control
levels to monitor joint and Cartesian positions and velocities, comparing both commands and
sensor feedback. A separate ESD bus, which connects the joint, manipulator, and power
controllers, is the path by which an ESD is initiated - removing power from the manipulator
systems. The first level checks that commanded values are within allowable limits both in the
manipulator controller and the joint controllers. The second level monitors safety critical
parameters such as position, velocity, and torque with the joint controllers and within the
manipulator controller collision avoidance routines. The final level of ESD monitoring is a check of
redundant safety critical parameters in the redundant manipulator controller and in independentjoint controllers.
In the event of an apparent failure, several possible ESD actions may be automatically initiated.
The operator, of course, has a manual ESD to power off the manipulator at any time. If monitored
values are elevated but do not pose immediate danger, a soft stop is initiated by the control
software. A soft stop commands the manipulator to hold the current position with brakes off
(disengaged). An example of a soft stop condition is a Cartesian manipulator command which
violates a warning boundary near a known obstacle. A hardware ESD is initiated by any controller
when an analog sensor value exceeds its limit - resulting in an ESD notification on the ESD bus.
These analog comparisons are being performed at 1500 Hz. A software ESD occurs when a
controller CPU detects an out-of -limit condition and signals the power module over the MiI-Std-
1553B communication bus. The power module then initiates a combination ESD to power off the
manipulator. A combination ESD is detected by software comparisons in the controllers and
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initiates a software reset of a hardware limit value to force a hardware ESD. All these ESD paths
were analyzed to determine reaction times to various failures such as a joint runaway. Hardware
ESD's occur in 11 msec, combination ESD's occur in 30 to 206 msec, and a combination ESD may
take up to 4026 msec for an over-temperature condition.
GriDDer/End-of-Arm Tooling
The end-of-arm tooling built for the FTS manipulator has a parallel jaw gripper and space for later
addition of an end-effector exchange mechanism. The gripper fingers are a cruciform designed
for positive contact and retention because the gripper is backdrivable. The gripper fingers ride on
a rack and pinion driven by a harmonic drive transmission and a single DC-motor. A pair of fail-safe
brakes are installed to provide fault tolerance against inadvertent release. Brake failure or brake
command failure results in a brake defaulting to its engaged position. Each of the two brakes can
withstand forces greater than expected gripper forces (maximum anticipated load is 30 Ib, brake
hold is 50 lb.). Gripper forces are measure by a torque sensor and also by motor currents. The
concern over inadvertent release also impacted the design the planned task items. These items
were instrumented to insure positive grasp. As a final safety measure, the gripper fingers are
attached with EVA compatible bolts which may be removed on-orbit to release the gripper.
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Robotic Manipulator Systems can provide the capability to perform work and assist humans in
space as long as they are safe and reliable. The space based requirements differ significantlyfrom
terrestrial based manipulators used in Industry and research. In most terrestrial robot
implementations, the prime method for dealing with failures is to keep workers out of the robot
workspace when active and by accepting the occasional parts damage following a failure due to
high volume parts fabrication. This approach is not acceptable for space applications where
humans are involved, and the effect impacts the design requirements for space manipulator
systems.
Hazards and Controls
All manned space flight systems are assessed for flight hazards their use Imposes. From such an
assessment the causes of those hazards are determined, and methods to control those hazards
are developed. To gain flight acceptance, multiple levels of hazard control must be designed for
and verified for assuring the desired level and coverage of controls. In the FTS system
development, safe control of hazardous operations forced additional requirements in the design
of the manipulator system, its interfaces with the Orbiter and the task elements the FTS was to
demonstrate interaction with.
The primary hazards associated with the FTS manipulator operations and the three methods for
providing safe control are listed:
A) Unplanned contact or impact during operations
1) Operator and computer control to not command unplanned contact.
2) Boundary management software operation.
3) Redundant boundary management software operation in the safety computer
B) Inadvertent release of hardware
1) Hardwired enable gripper brake power from independent switch in the aft flight deck
2) PGSC (Portable General Support Computer: laptop computer) command to release gripper
Brake #1
3) Hand controller switch to release gripper Brake #2
C) Failure to stow for safe Orbiter landing
1) Normal computer operations (With hardwired control for added reliability)
2) Jettison via RMS (or EVA if time permits)
3) EVA operations to stow or jettison
D) Excessive applied gripper force or torque
1) Force control using gripper force sensor
2) Current limiting ESD (Emergency shutdown detection)
3) Redundant current limiting ESD
E) Excessive applied manipulator force or torque
1) Normal control with active Cartesian load from joint torque command
2) Cartesian force limiting, using wrist force/torque sensor channel A
3) Redundant Cartesian force limiting, using wrist force/torque sensor channel B.
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Mission Ooeration To Control Hazards
Primary concerns in the design of space manipulator systems have to do with the effects of
system failures on the crew or vehicle. Operational limitations of use are placed on robotic
systems that may otherwise be perfectly capable of performing their Intended operations.
Limitationon use are due to the fact that if a system is performing a task and were to have a failure,
the effect of that failure must not prohibit the intended function from being performed in the time
frame that that function is critically needed, and any failure must not prohibit any other safety
related operations from being carried out during its time of criticality..
For a system to continue operations after a failure, any remaining operability the system might
contain must also provide that same capability to make itself safe to the vehicle and crew if it were
to suffer a failure. Otherwise that additional level of operability would only be allowed for
temporary use to make the task situation safe, remove the robot from the task area, and then stow
it in a safe returnable state or eject it so the vehicle can return to Earth. The added operability
would not be allowed for continued use to proceed with the intended task, except to make the
situation safe. This is the fundamental concept of hazard control for the Orbiter.
FTS Fail Safe Ooerations
Several FTS configuration descriptions follow below along with design features to address key
functions which allow for safe operations. The designs comply with NASA's Orbiter safety policy
and requirements of NSTS 1700.7B with interpreted in NSTS 18798A. In several cases, the
hardware or software system could not be designed to meet the required levels of fault tolerance
without significantly complicating the design or dexterity of the manipulator system. Therefore
reductions in compliance with the safety requirements placed operational limitations on the use of
the FTS System. The system is considered fail safe; where under any failure the system will not
cause a catastrophic hazard, and therefore does not jeopardize the safety of the Orbiter or crew.
The FTS system is not fail-operational. Such a system, after any initial failure, could continue
normal intended operations since it would still retain the ability to make itseff safe after a second
failure.
The DTF-1 concept fulfills the first method of hazard control for Orbiter safety using its normal
modes of operation. If any of the single points of failure occur, normal operations will cease and an
attempt to safe the manipulator system by use of the hardwired control. Note that hardwired
control is only a supplement to the first level of hazard control. If the manipulator system cannot
be safed by use of the hardwire control, the mission will be assessed to determine if enough time
remains to perform an EVA to safe the manipulator system. If hardwired control cannot safe the
manipulator system and time does not permit an EVA to safe the manipulator or remove it for
stowage, then the RMS will grapple the telerobot using the RMS grapple fixture for jettison. This
is the second method for hazard control. The third method of hazard control to provide two fault
tolerance for Orbiter safety is EVA operations. Remedial operations could be to remove the
manipulator, release the gripper and/or release the actuator brakes. This is to allow stowage of the
manipulator, either into its caging devices or by removal and strapping it in the airlock, or otherwise
by release into orbit.
Hardwired Control
The FTS system incorporates a backup hardwired control capability in the event of a failure which
precludes closed loop computer control of the manipulator system. The main purpose is to
minimize the likelihood of having to jettison the system or perform an EVA operation. This has the
effect of making the computer system, sensor systems, software, servo systems and most other
hardware single fault tolerant, even though the operations would be significantly degraded in
performance.
Operational use of the hardwired control is limitedto sating of the system after a failure, by stowing
the arm to allow a safe Orbiter return. It allows operator control of individual manipulator joints for
stowage and for gripper actuation in the event of computer control or motor drive failure. When
selected, primary power is removed from all manipulator motor and brake drivers while retaining
power to camera controls. Software recognizes the status of the hardwire control, and commands
off all motors and brakes, so that return to normal computer operations after hardwired control
starts with all motors and brakes powered off.
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Hardwirecontrolis limitedto very lowjoint ratesandtorquesin a twofault tolerantmanner.
Hardwired control is by sequential, joint-by-joint movement,and provided no force
accommodation to minimize forces imparted into interfaces. Only a limited set of initiated tasks are
likely to be able to be completed. Emergency shutdown detection (ESD) is not operational during
hardwired control operation, as the operator can de-power the hardwire drive to stop payload
motion, and brakes can also be used to stop motion.
Several failures of components employ EVA as the third fault tolerant paths to ensure stowage of
DTF-1 for safe return of the Orbiter. The manipulator actuators, gripper mechanism, and
manipulator caging mechanisms represent major groups of such components.
Failure of a caging mechanism to release the arm for operation would not require EVA for sating
the manipulator. EVA would be used as the third path for sating the manipulator if more than one
of the four caging mechanism fail to close. In this case, removal of the manipulator at its shoulder
interface and either manual release into orbitor stowage in the airlock would be required.
Failure of a manipulator actuator motor drive electrically or mechanically would require EVA as the
third fault tolerant path. Mechanical release of the joint actuator brake allows EVA backdrive of the
joint into the caging position. If a manipulator joint seizes, then EVA is employed as the third fault
tolerant path to remove the manipulator at the shoulder and release into orbit or stowage in the
airlock.
Single-Points Failures:
There are several single point failures that remain in the FTS system which may lead to failure of
the manipulator to complete a task, or to stow itself for a safe Orbiter return. For the Orbiter this is
considered a catastrophic hazard, therefore the requirements for payloads to provide two fault
tolerant methods of dealing with these effects.
The FTS single-point failures which lead to an EVA or jettison are few in function, but have
commonality within the actuator and gripper. These failures are seized bearings or gears, a short
within the motor winding, or a short or open in a brake winding.
Safety Critical Subsystems
The DTF-1 Flight Experiment of FTS has fifteen different safety critical subsystems and
equipment groups, as listed.
Structure Subsystem
Control
Data Management and Processing
Vision
Software
End-of-Arm Tooling
Task Panel Elements
Hand Controllers
Thermal Control
Electrical
Power
Sensors
Manipulator
Electromechanical Devices
Aft Deck Workstation
This is only a listing, descriptions of these subsystems will be presented in a future paper.
119
REFERENCES
Shattuck, P. L., and Lowrie, J. W., Flight Telerobotic Servicer Legacy, SPIE Vol. 1829
Cooperative Intelligent Robotics in Space III, 1992, pg. 60 - 74.
Andary, J. F., Hewitt, D. R., and Hinkal, S. W., The Flight Telerobotic Servicer Tinman Concept:
System Design Drivers and Task Analysis, Proceedings of the NASA Conference on Space
Telerobotics, Vol. III, January 31, 1989, pg. 447 - 471.
Flight Telerobotic Servicer Development Test Flight (DTF-1) Final Report, MD-15, Martin Marietta
Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA Goddard Space Flight Center under contract NAS5-
30689, 1991.
Space Station Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) Phase C/D DTF-1 Phase II Safety Compliance
Data Package for Payload Design and Flight Operations, 01-PA-32-08, Martin Marietta
Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA Goddard Space Flight Center under contract NAS5-
30689, August 1, 1991.
Space Station Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) DTF-1 System Critical Design Review, 01-MD-02-
CDR-02, Martin Marietta Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
under contract NAS5-30689, October 2, 1990.
Space Station Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) Design Criteria Document, 87600000005 Rev. N,
Martin Marietta Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA Goddard Space Flight Center under
contract NAS5-30689, March 23, 1990.
Space Station Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) DTF-1 Manipulator Subsystem Specification -
Rnal, 01-TR-20-MS-06, Martin Marietta Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center under contract NAS5-30689, December 4, 1991.
Space Station Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) DTF-1 Control Stability Analysis and Simulation
Report, 01-TR-05-02, Martin Marietta Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center under contract NAS5-30689, October 11, 1990.
Space Station Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) DTF-1 Control Stability Analysis and Simulation
Report - Preliminary, 01-TR-05-01, Martin Marietta Astronautics Group, submitted to NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center under contract NAS5-30689, July 10, 1989.
120
